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A proposal of a competent authority? 
 
Clause 7.7(1)(b) of the REIQ contract for Houses and Land (5th edition) allows a 
purchaser to terminate if, at the contract date, the land is affected by an undisclosed 
proposal of any competent authority to alter the dimensions of any road or railway 
abutting the land or locate a road or railway through the land.1 
 
The interpretation of the contractual term ‘proposal’ has caused considerable difficulty 
over the years.  When does the intention of a competent authority become ‘a proposal’? 
 
In Gagliardi v Lamont,2 evidence was adduced to the effect that the local authority 
officers had considered acquisition of the land for resumption but the Council itself had 
not given any consideration to it.  Matthews J held that to be a proposal ‘there must be 
an intention which has been given force to by adoption by means of a resolution or 
adoption by some other process which gives the intention operative effect’.3  Unofficial 
speculation will not constitute a proposal under the contractual provision. 
 
In Ex parte Christensen4 the sellers sold land abutting an arterial road.  At the date of 
contract, the Main Roads Department had ‘an approved planning layout’ which was 
designed to provide for the future widening of the road, and, if brought into effect, would 
require the resumption of a 3.5 metre strip of land from the front of the actual land.  The 
Department had at the time no proposal to construct the widened road or any 
immediate or fixed intention to resume the land although its intention could change. 
 
Thomas J considered that these circumstances were a ‘halfway house’ between an 
unpublished intention and a notice of intention to resume and in his opinion the 
necessary events had occurred to make the plan an official authorised document 
representing the present intention of the Minister notwithstanding that the intention 
could change.5  On this basis, there was a proposal that affected the land. 
 
                                                          
1  It should be noted that Standard Commercial Conditions 2nd ed GST Reprint, cl 
21.1(c) does not contain the words ‘or locate a road or railway through the land’.  The 
absence of these words will be significant in circumstances where the road or railway 
is not abutting the land: Hynes Holdings Pty Ltd v Noomar Investments Pty Ltd [2003] 
QSC 31.  In that instance, relief was denied where a proposed railway line was to be 
constructed through the land. 
2 [1976] Qd R 53. 
3 Ibid 54. 
4 [1984] 1 Qd R 382. 
5  Duncan and Jones, Sale of Land in Queensland (LBC, Sydney, 1996) 203 
A recent decision, Grant v McRoss Developments Pty Ltd,6 provides further guidance 
as to the meaning of ‘proposal’.  The issue for determination was whether the possibility 
of the diversion of an abutting road through the land purchased should be characterised 
as a ‘proposal’ of the Brisbane City Council, being a competent authority.  The draft plan 
had not been endorsed by the Council by resolution, or adopted by any authorised 
delegate.  The defendant buyer argued that its purported termination of the contract 
was valid as the council, in response to the defendant’s development application, had 
requested that altered material be provided which did not prejudice the deviation of the 
road and provided draft plans depicting a diverted road. 
 
Having reviewed relevant authorities, de Jersey CJ agreed with the analysis of 
Matthews J in Gagliardi v Lamont 7 that a ‘proposal’ requires a resolution or adoption by 
some other process sufficient to give the intention some operative effect.  In this 
instance, the Council had not formally endorsed or adopted the plans as a proposal.  
The plans were no more than a draft concept design.  Unlike the position in Ex parte 
Christensen,8 the draft plans could not be characterised as approved or definitive.  The 
plans were merely floating a possible future development. 
 
The mere fact that a Council officer had drawn the plans to the attention of the buyer 
was not sufficient to elevate the plans to being a proposal of the Council itself.  On this 
basis the land was not affected by a ‘proposal’ and the seller was entitled to specific 
performance.  In practical terms, de Jersey CJ provided considerable guidance as to 
the operation of this particular contractual provision: 
Parties to contracts in these terms are to be taken, so far as local authority proposals are 
concerned, to be contemplating proposals which have force and currency because 
definitively adopted by the local authority itself.  Otherwise a great deal of uncertainty 
would attend the determination of the obligation to disclose and the right to terminate.  At 
what point short of council resolution would a proposal be regarded as a proposal ‘of’ the 
Council?  There would arguably be a multitude of possibilities.  Presumably to avoid that 
sort of uncertainty, at least so far as local authorities are concerned, in referring to a 
proposal ‘of’ the competent authority, these contracting parties are to be seen as 
contemplating only proposals formally endorsed by the local authority itself by following 
the requisite procedures.9 
 
                                                          
6  [2003] QSC 169. 
7  [1976] Qd R 53. 
8  [1984] 1 Qd R 382. 
9  Grant v McRoss Developments Pty Ltd [2003] QSC 169, [20]. 
This case, and its predecessors, clearly demonstrates that considerable investigation 
should be undertaken (concerning the status of plans) before a buyer purports to 
terminate in reliance on this contractual provision. 
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